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Solidarity through National Pride: The Future of Catholic Politics in the 21st
Century
Abstract
This paper raises the Pragmatist concepts of solidarity and national pride, as espoused by American
philosophers such as John Dewey and Richard Rorty, as potential means for Catholics in Western
democratic nations to approach the current political issues facing them in the 21st century. Though
Dewey and Rorty were neither politicians nor Catholics (being liberal thinkers trained in philosophy), their
views on solidarity and patriotism in modern liberal democracies provide useful roadmaps for Catholics in
Europe and the Anglosphere to navigate our present period of polarised and highly partisan politics,
potentially reaching a ‘sensible centre’ akin to the American Catholic political tradition since the 1930s.
This centrism relies on this Pragmatist solidarity through a shared hope of a pluralistic society constantly
improved upon for the benefit of future generations. Catholics can only achieve this solidarity and hope if
they feel, in the spirit of Rorty, a deep sense of national pride for their country. This type of national pride
is not reactionary in nature, but advocates a politics of pluralism rather than identity, democratic
nationalism rather than amorphous internationalism, and active engagement in the public square to
implement an achievable political programme of action which is hopeful and borne out of a collective
imagination for a better future for their countries.

This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics:
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Solidarity through National Pride: Catholic Politics in the Age of Populism
Christopher J. Dowson
I. Introduction
It is not difficult to make the case that the Catholic Church in Western democracies now faces
a challenge, not solely of faith but also of politics. The ‘Catholic vote’ in the 2016 United
States Presidential Election was almost evenly split between the internationalist liberal
policies of Hillary Clinton and the nationalist-conservative ones of Donald Trump. Regardless
of Pope Francis’ political obiter dicta,1 Catholics in America produced high levels of support
for Trump (exit polling in fact showed that Trump won the Catholic vote 52% to 48%2),
whose worldview appears largely opposed to the Pope’s, notably on contentious issues such
as immigration.3 In Europe, in the 2018 national and 2019 European Parliamentary elections,
Italian voters appeared to favour populist and anti-immigration platforms in large numbers,
prompting media headlines warning of a rising ‘right wing nationalism’ across Europe and
suggesting that the Catholic Church had ‘lost Italy to the far right’.4
This paper seeks to address the question of how Catholics might approach politics in
this current era of political populism and reactionary nationalism. I aim to focus primarily
upon American philosopher Richard Rorty’s concepts of national pride and solidarity and
hope and imagination and propose that these interconnected concepts offer potential antidotes
for Catholics to the current political polarisation facing both the Church and Western
democracies. Specifically, I will examine the first two concepts in the framework of three
major civic issues currently facing Western democracies: multiculturalism, nationalism, and
internationalism.
II. Defining Solidarity
It must be made clear ab initio what the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘national pride’ refer to in
Rorty’s framework. Rorty does not directly link the two but, reading them in tandem, they
provide a fruitful starting point for a political outlook that may be relevant to all Catholics,
despite their geopolitical circumstances. Achieving Our Country is the seminal work in which
Rorty makes the distinction between the pride of identity politics and ‘national pride’, the
former identified with the post-1960s ‘cultural Left’ and the latter with the pre-1960’s Leftist
tradition typified within social organisations such as trade unions and labour movements,
1

See e.g. Phillip Pullella, “Pope says he would confront Trump directly on border wall”, Reuters, 29 May 2019
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-pope/pope-says-he-would-confront-trump-directly-onborder-wall-idUSKCN1SY23S
2
M. N. Schmaltz, “How the Support of Catholics Helped Donald Trump’s Victory”, Fortune, 9 November 2016,
http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-election-2016-catholic-vote.
3
See e.g. H. Sherwood, “Pope Francis appears to criticize Trump’s Mexico border wall plan”, The Guardian, 9
February 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/pope-francis-walls-bridges-donald-trump,
where Francis is reported to have said not to ‘[…] raise walls but bridges […] A Christian can never say: “I’ll
make you pay for that.” Never! That is not a Christian gesture. An offense is overcome with forgiveness, by
living in peace with everyone.’
4
See e.g. Mattia Ferrarsi, ‘How the Catholic Church Lost Italy to the Far Right’, New York Times, 4 July 2019 <
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/04/opinion/catholic-church-italy.html>; Editorial, “Make no mistake – rightwing populism is making a resurgence in Europe, as the Italian elections show”, The Independent, 5 March
2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/italy-election-results-populsim-resurgence-europe-antieu-silvio-berlusconi-5-star-movement-luigi-di-a8240861.html; Bernd Riegert, “Italy's election results highlight a
European trend”, Deutsche Welle, 6 March 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-italys-election-resultshighlight-a-european-trend/a-42841622.
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occupied with concrete policy change in America’s institutions, as opposed to broader
theories of oppression, victimisation and identity. Rorty argues that ‘taking pride in being
black or gay is an entirely reasonable response to the sadistic humiliation to which one has
been subjected’, yet if this same pride inhibits someone from also taking pride in being an
American citizen, ‘from thinking of his or her country as capable of reform, or from being
able to join with straights or whites in reformist initiatives, it is a political disaster’.5 Rorty
describes the concept of ‘solidarity’ as the ability to see traditional differences such as tribe,
religion or race as ‘unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and
humiliation’.6 Contrary to the metaphysicians who pine for a meta-language that transcends
individual group vocabularies and historical narratives - solidarity is achieved by taking
account of the contingencies of our shared histories, places, and cultures with a view to
reducing pain and cruelty through civic commonalities. Solidarity, Rorty argues, has to be
constructed ‘out of little pieces, rather than found already waiting, in the form of an urlanguage which all of us recognize when we hear it’.7
By fusing Rorty’s concepts of national pride and solidarity, one may assert the following
propositions:
1. We cannot feel solidarity with people of vastly different beliefs, cultures, nationalities
etc., if we cannot first feel solidarity with our own fellow citizens;
2. Identity politics and pride in one’s ‘group’ – whether defined by race, gender,
sexuality or religion – is acceptable up until the point it precludes a feeling of pride for
one’s nation, in which case it ought to be abandoned; and
3. Without pride in one’s nation, there is no incentive to reform it, to improve it, to
reduce pain and cruelty towards others, or to engage in the ongoing process of selfcreation with fellow citizens.
Contrary to popular tropes describing nationalism as isolationist, ignorant of international
issues, and self-absorbed, it is possible that by combining Rorty’s concepts of national pride
and solidarity, an opposing praxis will result. If national pride is widespread, ‘solidarity’ (in
the social sense of reducing pain and cruelty towards other human beings) will, to use a
Rortyian phrase, ‘take care of itself’.
III. Rorty’s Secularism and Catholics
A preliminary question to address is how a secularist philosopher like Rorty can serve as a
useful scion upon which Catholics might graft a cohesive and modern political worldview.
Rorty was nominally a supporter of the American liberal Left and had little time for religion
as part of his political philosophy, arguing for a culture of liberalism ‘which was enlightened,
secular […] in which no trace of divinity remained’.8 Yet Catholics need not limit their
intellectual sources of inspiration on issues such as politics, social policy, or national pride
simply to Catholic intellectuals, indeed even Christian ones. The risk of doing so presents the
problem of the intellectual ‘bubble’, one less capable of addressing broader socio-political
concerns not directly pertaining to doctrinal matters. The Church has historically found much
value in non-Christian philosophers, especially in its incipient years with St Thomas Aquinas
and St Augustine of Hippo borrowing liberally from the authorities of non-Christians (Plato
and Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca, among others). Further, the suggestion of an alternative
5

Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country (Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 1998), 100.
Ibid, 192.
7
Ibid., 94.
8
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 45.
6
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political programme of action to the Pope’s by the laity is not at all at odds with Catholic
teaching. As St Pius X said of the separation between the teachings of the Church and the
political duties of the citizen:
Every Catholic, from the fact that he is also a citizen, has the right and the duty to
work for the common good in the way he thinks best, without troubling himself about
the authority of the Church, without paying any heed to its wishes, its counsels, its
orders - nay, even in spite of its reprimands.9
The Pragmatists themselves were historically neither hostile nor dismissive of religious
‘truth’, as William James wrote: ‘[O]n pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works
satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true.’10 Even accepting Rorty’s secularism
on face value, such a description of his religiopolitical worldview is only superficial. As
Boffetti observed, Rorty transitioned from a militant secularist early in his career to a
‘romantic polytheist’ who often deployed religious tropes in support of his own ideal of a
liberal democratic political community.11 In works such as Achieving Our Country, Boffetti
noted that Rorty described a uniquely ‘American faith’ whose acolytes have included Walt
Whitman, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Abraham Lincoln: ‘Sometimes Rorty calls this
American faith a “religion of democracy” and at other times “romantic polytheism.”’12 In any
case, that ‘being religious’ is a necessary antecedent for Catholics to glean insight from a
philosopher is clearly a straitlaced approach to the development of political opinions and
ought not militate against the arguments proposed in this paper.
IV. Rory’s Pluralism and Francis’ Multiculturalism Compared
In the article ‘The Unpatriotic Academy’ in 1994, Rorty admitted that, although ‘any Left is
better than none’, there was a problem with the New Left - it was unpatriotic: ‘In the name of
“the politics of difference,” it refuses to rejoice in the country it inhabits,’ he wrote. ‘It
repudiates the idea of a national identity, and the emotion of national pride. This repudiation
is the difference between traditional American pluralism and the new movement called
multiculturalism’.13 Regarding this latter attitude, Pope Francis has frequently emphasised the
need for such ‘multiculturalism’ as an intrinsic part of European identity. In a speech in
Krakow on World Youth Day in 2016, Francis implored: ‘Today, we adults need you to teach
us […] how to live in diversity, in dialogue, to experience multiculturalism not as a threat but
an opportunity.’ In the Evangelii Gaudium [253], he implored Christians to ‘[…] embrace
with affection and respect Muslim immigrants to our countries in the same way that we hope
and ask to be received and respected in countries of Islamic tradition’. In a May 2016 speech,
Francis went further and stated: ‘[I]t is not enough simply to settle individuals geographically:
the challenge is that of a profound cultural integration’.14 He stated that current political
activity needed to see the urgency of this integration: ‘[T]he roots of Europe, were
consolidated down the centuries by the constant need to integrate in new syntheses the most
varied and discrete cultures. The identity of Europe is, and always has been, a dynamic and
9

St Pius X, “Pascendi Dominici Gregis” (Encyclical, Rome, 8 September, 1907), 24.
William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (London, 1907), 299.
11
Jason. Boffetti, “How Richard Rorty Found Religion,” First Things 143 (May 2004), 24.
12
Ibid, 25; see also ‘civic religion’ in Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 101.
13
Richard Rorty, “The Unpatriotic Academy”, New York Times, 13 February 1994,
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/13/opinion/the-unpatriotic-academy.html?mcubz=1
14
Pope Francis, “Conferral of the Charlemagne Prize - Address of His Holiness Pope Francis” (Sala Regalia, 6
May 2016).
10
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multicultural identity.’15 Such a characterisation of European civilisation echoes the Hegelian
trope of constant syntheses (of ideas, classes, identities or cultures etc.), brought about by
oppositions with the ‘Other’.16 Rorty made the point that: ‘The Hegelian hope is that the
result of such struggles will be a new culture, better than any of those of which it is the
synthesis’.17 Yet unless one interprets Francis’ use of the terms ‘multiculturalism’ and
‘integration’ as synonymic with ‘pluralism’, I think this approach needs readjustment.
In Contingency, Rorty goes to great lengths to use ‘solidarity’ as a real-world
phenomenon (as distinct from theological or philosophic foundations), which encompasses
the shared mutual obligations of a community of ‘liberals’ in the West. Its aim is to reduce
cruelty and pain and to enlarge the ethnos to include more individuals who support their
country and have a shared goal of liberalism and moral progress. Rorty’s civic nationalism is
not ethnocentric but liberal-centric; it is limited to the ethnos that contains liberal-minded
communities who believe in moral progress, as opposed to an international multiculturalism:
‘What takes the curse off this ethnocentrism is not that the largest such group is “humanity”
or “all rational beings” […] but, rather, that it is the ethnocentrism of a “we” (“we liberals”)
which is dedicated to enlarging itself, to creating an ever larger and more variegated ethnos’.18
Rorty elsewhere argues the ‘romance of endless diversity’ ought not to be confused with what
is called ‘multiculturalism’, which he defines as: ‘A politics of side-by-side development in
which members of distinct cultures preserve and protect their own culture against the
incursion of other cultures’.19 In The Demonization of Multiculturalism, Rorty proposes that:
‘[I]t is not to the advantage either of our country or of those whom it still treats as secondclass citizens to urge, as the multiculturalists do, that we think of the United States as “a salad
rather than a melting pot”’.20 From Francis’ comments above, I want to suggest that it is
possible to read some of the Pope’s past comments on multiculturalism as being consonant
with Rorty’s desire for an integrated, pluralistic societal structure – but this is not without
some caveats.
In a May 2016 speech, Francis warned against those in Europe who are tempted by
‘selfish interests’ and who consider ‘putting up fences here and there’, in an oblique reference
to the exclusion of illegal immigrants arriving in southern Europe. Francis asserted: ‘The
identity of Europe is, and always has been, a […] multicultural identity’.21 That the continent
of Europe historically consisted of different cultures is a truism, but the context of this phrase
appears to be broader, alluding to the problems associated with mass migration from nonEuropean regions, particularly controversial issues in Europe and the Anglosphere today.
Francis approached this same subject in another way in his Address to the Council of Europe
in 2014:
[T]oday […] we can legitimately speak of a “multipolar” Europe. Its tensions –
whether constructive or divisive – are situated between multiple cultural, religious
and political poles. Europe today confronts the challenge of “globalizing”, but in a
creative way, this multipolarity. Nor are cultures necessarily identified with individual
15

Ibid.
E.g. see Georg W.F. Hegel, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Chapter 22: ‘Der Herr ist das für sich
seiende Bewußtsein, aber nicht mehr nur der Begriff desselben, sondern für sich seiendes Bewußtsein, welches
durch ein anderes Bewußtsein mit sich vermittelt ist, nämlich durch ein solches, zu dessen Wesen es gehört, daß
es mit selbstständigem Sein oder der Dingheit überhaupt synthesiert ist.’
17
Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 25.
18
Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 198.
19
Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 24.
20
Richard Rorty, “The Demonization of Multiculturalism,” Journal of Blacks in Higher Education 7 (1995): 74.
21
Pope Francis, “Conferral of the Charlemagne Prize - Address of His Holiness Pope Francis” (Sala Regalia, 6
May 2016), emphasis added.
16
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countries: some countries have a variety of cultures and some cultures are expressed in
a variety of countries. The same holds true for political, religious, and social
aggregations. Creatively globalizing multipolarity, and I wish to stress this creativity,
calls for striving to create a constructive harmony, one free of those pretensions to
power which, while appearing from a pragmatic standpoint to make things easier, end
up destroying the cultural and religious distinctiveness of peoples […] Today Europe
is multipolar in its relationships and its intentions; it is impossible to imagine or to
build Europe without fully taking into account this multipolar reality.22
The use of the term ‘multipolar’ amounts to the same outcome as using ‘multicultural’ and,
read with the cautions against ‘destroying the cultural and religious distinctiveness of
peoples’ could easily invoke images of European nations as ‘salad bowls’, not melting pots
(to apply Rorty’s metaphor). Certainly the ‘creative multiploarity’ Francis speaks of appears
to be at odds with Rorty’s vision of a pluralistic society with a singular and common national
pride in its country. Further, it is unclear from his speech whether Francis makes the
distinction between cultural distinctiveness in private as opposed to public distinctiveness.
The latter brings with it a plethora of issues, contentious ones to be sure, which affect the
civic life of a nation and would certainly run counter to the Rortyian notion of ‘pluralism’,
which he defined as ‘in your private life, in your religious life, in your spiritual life, be free to
be as distinctive […] as you want to be. When it comes to public affairs, your culture, your
individual ideals of perfection, your religion, should be irrelevant.’23 Francis’ statement that a
constructive harmony in European societies is required, free from ‘pretensions to power’
which can destroy ‘the cultural and religious distinctiveness of peoples’ is also ambiguous as
regards immigration and multiculturalism in 21st-century Europe, but it is possible to argue,
along Rorty’s lines, that in the public (civic) sense, such cultural difference and distinction
should be deemed irrelevant. Public policy ought not be made on the basis of a group’s
religious beliefs or ethnic status, for example, but for the best interests of the public as whole.
A globalised Europe with multiple cultures living side by side, often with different aims,
beliefs, goals and imaginations, is politically unwieldy. Should a government favour one
cultural group’s set of values over another’s? If so, on which bases? In this sense, Francis’
‘multipolarity’ could lead to polarisation, since polarisation is an integral part of being
multipolar (by definition).
V. ‘National Pride’ and Solidarity
A reshaping of Francis’ argument above, pari passu with the concept of Rorty’s ‘national
pride’, would be along the lines of the following: European nations are and always have been
‘multicultural’, but disparate cultures within each nation, though distinct in their private lives
(worship, customs, beliefs, etc), ought to possess shared goals and hopes that might improve
and reform their countries for the better (i.e. their civic life). A Chinese or Muslim citizen in
France may have different hopes for France than a Chinese or Muslim citizen in Poland, for
example. The fact these individuals share the same cultural and ethnic heritage should not
preclude their active contribution to reforming and improving their respective societies based
on their own unique socio-political circumstances and contingencies. This is not to repudiate
Francis’ argument, merely to suggest a more effective pathway to ‘creative’ globalisation, as
His Holiness termed it. If Chinese individuals in Poland or France actively seek to improve
22

Pope Francis, “Address of Pope Francis to the Council of Europe” (Strasbourg, 25 November 2014), emphasis
added.
23
‘Philosopher Richard Rorty.’ Forum, KQED Radio, 31 January, 2006, radio broadcast,
https://www.kqed.org/forum/601311000/philosopher-richard-rorty.
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their countries, in conjunction with their fellow citizens, with a shared goal about what Poland
or France could look like 10 to 50 years from now, then I would argue that the potential for
improvement across Europe in general greatly increases. A stronger, more harmonious and
constantly improving Poland or France with fewer racial, ethnic, or sexual tensions, provides
benefits to Europe, and the global community at large. Such an example highlights the
interwoven connection between ‘national pride’ and ‘solidarity’.
Francis comes far closer to the political and social ‘solidarity’ that I have suggested
above when he refers to French statesman and Biblical scholar Robert Schuman in his May
2016 address: ‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be
built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity’. Francis stressed,
in relation to the Migrant Crisis facing Europe, that there was ‘a need to return to the same de
facto solidarity and concrete generosity that followed the Second World War’. The use of
‘solidarity’ here would seem to be in line with what Rorty and other Pragmatists would see as
a beneficial approach to modern politics.
VI. Hope Through Solidarity: Catholics and Democratic Liberalism
In Achieving, Rorty provides a quote from historian Nelson Lichtenstein who said that
America’s great reformist movements, from the abolitionist movements of the 19th century to
the labour movements in the 1930s, ‘defined themselves as champions of moral and patriotic
nationalism, which they counter-posed to the parochial and selfish elites which stood athwart
their vision of a virtuous society’.24 The idea for Rorty was that the improvements in social
conditions for Americans since the turn of the 20th century were embodied by a ‘hope’ within
Leftist politics, hope in the form of a national pride. Rorty lamented that, with the rise of
postmodern politics of identity within the universities after the Vietnam era, the New Left had
become devoid of pride: ‘[A] nation cannot reform itself unless it takes pride in itself – unless
it has an identity, rejoices in it, reflects upon it and tries to live up to it’.25 Such a view of
solidarity through pride in one’s national identity (as opposed to an amorphous international
‘multicultural identity’) ought to be adopted by Catholics in the West. The benefits of such an
approach would translate into a political programme which could bring Catholics towards a
majoritarian political position less susceptible to radical Left or Right ideologies, especially in
the current era where such polarity is endemic within global politics.
To adopt Lichtenstein’s sentiments above, the credit of the early leftist movements
and their union counterparts were pluralistic and driven to action, united by a shared pride in
their country rather than their disparate ethnic, religious, or sexual identities. American
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr stressed the need for pluralism on multiple occasions, most
vociferously against the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in Detroit during the 1920s. Niebuhr
proclaimed: ‘We are admonished in Scripture to judge men by their fruits, not by their roots;
and their fruits are their character, their deeds and accomplishments’.26 This approach
removes the emphasis on identity politics in both the Left and Right, and instead underscores
the shared motives citizens ought to be focused on to improve their countries, and to
contribute to it in positive ways, rather than fracturing into various multicultural identities,
pitting one against another and confusing the goals of a democratic society.
What it means to live in a Western democracy is to envision democratic liberalism as
an ‘ideal’, though far from perfect or objectively ‘right’, but nonetheless something for which
to strive. As John Dewey wrote: ‘We have a preference for democracy in politics […]
24

Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 14.
Richard Rorty. “The Unpatriotic Academy”. New York Times, 13 February 1994,
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/13/opinion/the-unpatriotic-academy.html?mcubz=1.
26
Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (New York, 1985), 91 (emphasis added).
25
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Responsible government and publicity are our ideal, and upon the whole the ideal fares as
well as most ideals in a rude and imperfect world’.27 It is on such a basis that Catholics would
be better served politically by advocating for a shared national pride in their countries. This
pride ought to be enthusiastic, but not of the kind Immanuel Kant warned: Schwärmerei, the
fanatical boasting and blind cheering for one’s nation without admitting to its flaws or
shortcomings.28 Instead, Catholics should not refrain from debate within the public square,
and indeed should be impelled to action where there are serious social and economic
challenges to be addressed. Behind all of these political efforts there must be something
tangible for which to strive, lest it become an unanchored desire purely indifferent to the
trajectory of the society in which one lives. In St John Paul II’s Sollicitudo rei Socialis, His
Holiness made this declaration on the meaning of Catholic solidarity:
[Solidarity] is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes
of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering
determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say, to the good of all
and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.29
One the one hand, St John Paul II’s description of solidarity echoes Rorty’s, and the latter
sentences of the quotation above should be borne in mind when discussing solidarity through
national pride. However, I would temper such a global definition of solidarity and instead
assert that, while an awareness of injustices abroad ought never to be ignored, this should not
first supersede an awareness of the injustices within one’s own country. If a society cannot
address pain and cruelty in its own country and feel compassion for those less fortunate in its
own communities, how can it hope to solve the myriad of injustices in other nations? To
borrow from Edward R. Murrow during the Cold War: ‘[W]e cannot defend freedom abroad
by deserting it at home’.30
VII. Solidarity Through Introspection
The internationalism that has been championed by the Vatican in the last few decades
parallels the pivot of the Western cultural left and corporate capitalists towards globalisation,
where foreign aid in record proportions has been donated from Europe and the Anglosphere
into the global south and developing nations, where international travel is relatively
inexpensive, and where the flow of capital between countries is lucrative, but which has led to
the increasingly rapid collapse of local blue-collar industries. In an essay for the Business
Ethics Quarterly 1998,31 Rorty quoted from an article by Edward Luttwack’s entitled “Why
Fascism is the Wave of the Future” (1994). Luttwack had gone to the trouble of analysing the
impact of globalism in America, characterised at the time by President Bill Clinton’s embrace
of multilateral trade deals such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
27

John Dewey, “Our National Dilemma”, in Characters and Events, vol. 2, ed. J. Ratner (New York: Henry Holt
and Co., 1929), 616-17.
28
See the distinction between Schwärmerei (fanaticism) and Enthusiasmus (enthusiasm) in Immanuel Kant, P.
Guyer (trans.) ‘Oberservations of the feeling of the beautiful and sublime’. In Anthropology, History, and
Education. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007)), 58 where Kant uses ‘patriotic virtue’ as an example of Enthusiasmus.
29
St John Paul II, “Sollicitudo rei Socialis” (Encyclical, Rome, 30 December, 1987), 38.
30
Edward Murrow, “A Report on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,” See It Now, Screened 9 March 1954 (CBS,
1954) Television Broadcast quoted in Joseph Wershba, “Murrow vs McCarthy: See It Now”, New York Times, 4
March 1979, < https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/04/archives/murrow-vs-mccarthy-see-it-now.html>
31
Richard Rorty. “Can American egalitarianism survive a globalized economy?” Business Ethics Quarterly,
Supplemental Volume (1998): 1-6.
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Luttwack noted that those working class Americans who had once earned decent wages in
blue-collar jobs would no longer tolerate politicians who permitted a catastrophic fall in
employment and in the standard of living. They would, according to Luttwack, ‘imitate the
behaviour of the Germans at the end of the Weimar period. They would turn to populist
rabble-rousers who would make empty promises, or else attempt to reinvigorate the economy
by starting’, presumably referencing the rise of early 1990s populists such as Patrick
Buchanan.32 Despite the eventual lack of such scenarios playing out in the 1990s or early
2000s, both authors remain equally prescient today. Both foretold some form of unpredictable
populism (for example Trumpism or Brexit) would be a likely consequence of unabated
globalism and quasi-free trade. Rorty observed that the gap between rich and poor had been
widening for twenty years, and noted a poll which suggested 57% of Americans thought that
life would be worse for their children than for themselves. He asserted that, if the
globalisation of the labour market accelerated at the predicted rate, vast areas of America
would be reliant on the State for their welfare and large-scale income inequality would result:
We know what happens when a middle class realises that its hopes have been
betrayed, that the system no longer works, that political leaders no longer know how
to shelter it from catastrophe. Middle class people look around for a scapegoatsomebody to blame for a catastrophe that they themselves did nothing to deserve.33
Despite the current nationalist fervour in the United States, the clear demand from voters on
both sides of politics for clearer economic programmes tailored to the lower-middle classes
could be seen as a sign of Catholic voters ‘introspecting’ again; that is, looking to the
fundamental economic and social issues of their own communities before attempting to turn
their minds to the myriad of similar or more grievous problems overseas. In the context of
Francis’ political push for internationalism and multiculturalism, it is understandable why
large groups of Catholics sympathised with Clinton’s worldview. Many Catholics have
become partial to Francis’ political position and if European democracies held polls on
whether they would prefer Trump or Clinton as their leader, many more European Catholics
might have voted for the latter.34 Yet given Francis’ position on issues such as
multiculturalism and immigration and his intense influence on many Catholics worldwide,
what, if anything, can explain the high level of support for populist nationalist candidates in
the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe?
VIII. Catholic Voters and ‘Patriotic Virtue’
This is explicable by first noting that the political locus of American Catholics has historically
been within the political centre, with Catholic voters comprising a part of the valuable swing
voting bloc which has decided the winner of every US Presidential election since 1972.35 I
stress here the adjective ‘American’ because I do not think many of the patriotic or
nationalistic tendencies within American Catholics are as widespread in European countries
(excepting perhaps Italy in recent times), or even in other parts of the Anglosphere like
Australia or Canada. One can trace the strengthening of American Catholic patriotism across
historic waypoints such as the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the labour movements of
32
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34
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35
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the 1930s, and finally the rise of John F. Kennedy to the White House by the early 1960s.
This is largely because an immense segment of the American trade union movement in the
early 1900s was driven by Catholic beliefs of solidarity, social justice (in the Catholic sense),
and fraternity.36 John McGreevy’s Catholicism and American Freedom, observes that it was
the Catholic priests across the United States during the 1930s who were encouraging their
parishioners to join labour unions, ‘some like Pittsburgh’s Charles Rice, Detroit’s Frederick
Siedenberg, and Buffalo’s Monsignor John P. Boland, served on regional [labour] boards and
played key roles in workplace negotiations’.37 These Catholics were not ashamed of their
country, but nor were they uncritical of its political character.38 Instead, they were hopeful
that if they each worked together towards a ‘New Deal’, then they could imagine and create
an America that would be a better place for them, their families, and their children’s children.
As Rorty argues, solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created: ‘It is created by
increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other,
unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalize
people different from ourselves.’39 This is the type of solidarity I take from the Rortyian
characterisation of ‘national pride’ or the Kantian ‘patriotic virtue’.
Reactionary politics is not novel to Catholics, especially working-class ones, in
Western nations,40 though it is by no means a sustainable panacea to today’s pressing political
issues. Yet without some nascent patriotic solidarity on the part of all American, German,
Italian, British or Australian Catholics alike, I do not think the political course of these
cultures’ respective nations can be lastingly altered. Isaiah Berlin argued against reactionary
national pride on the basis that, in his view, such nationalism was:
[…] [N]ationhood in a pathological state of inflammation: the result of wounds
inflicted by someone or something on the natural feelings of society, or of artificial
barriers to its normal development. This leads to the transformation of the notion of
the individual’s moral autonomy into the notion of the moral autonomy of the nation,
of the individual will into the national will to which individuals must submit, with
which they must identify themselves, of which they must be the active, unquestioning,
enthusiastic agents.41
Such a characterisation of nationalism seems too simplistic and indeed the latter sentences of
Berlin’s characterisation above can, and should, be construed as potentially positive
consequences for citizens. It would instead be prudent to caution against a national pride that
looks ‘inward’, uncoupled from the principle of solidarity, and certainly modern leftist
philosophers such as Slavoj Žižek have made the contrast between ‘healthy’, as opposed to

36
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‘excessive’, nationalism.42 If national pride leads to isolationism and apathy for fellow human
beings around the world, then the result is detrimental to a nation and to the global
community in which that nation and its citizens interact. However, beyond its own political
and legal institutions, to invoke a Kantian Reich der Zwecke, a democracy’s moral autonomy
can only be derived from the morality of its individual citizens. Enthusiastic and active
participation in that moral framework therefore breeds local, state, and national solidarity.
Solidarity does not (and should not) need to derive from a single, negative source; for
example, from perceived ‘wounds inflicted by someone or something’ (per Berlin), but
simply from a shared dream that perhaps individual circumstances could one day be improved
for future generations, a goal grounded in reducing pain and humiliation, incrementally, based
on the contingencies of history and circumstance. As Rorty explains:
The social glue holding together the ideal liberal society […] consists in little more
than a consensus that the point of social organization is to let everybody have a chance
at self creation to the best of his or her abilities […] This conviction would not be
based on a view about universally shared human ends, human rights, the nature of
rationality, the Good for Man, nor anything else. It would be a conviction based on
nothing more profound than the historical facts which suggest that without the
protection of something like the institutions of bourgeois liberal society, people will
be less able to work out their private salvations, create their private self-images,
reweave their webs of belief and desire in the light of whatever new people and books
they happen to encounter […] 43
IX. Hope and Imagination in Place of Reactionary Politics
Hegel saw the nation as a creative Geist or spirit that was constantly refashioning itself.44
Dewey saw it the same way, but viewed democracy as the best vehicle for reaching better
political outcomes for individuals.45 Similarly, Rorty asked the cultural Left to think about
changing the direction of the country through broad participation in a liberal democracy,
unified by a national pride instead of identity politics of difference. I think Hegel and the
American Pragmatists’ approach is the right one here. Real and lasting political change in
Western societies requires a national will, not a menagerie of individual ones. A national will
is an alloy of national pride and solidarity that, in turn, arises from local communities each
with shared concerns for the socio-economic futures of their children and grandchildren. The
importance of this contrast is central to this discussion; namely that the notion of ‘solidarity
through national pride’ turns on the proposition of whether the individual wills of its citizens
must be submitted to a national one. The answer must be in the affirmative. For democracy to
function, there must be a necessary collective imagination of where the nation should be
heading. If the autonomy of the individual is supreme and the needs of a nation are
consistently secondary, polarisation and division quickly become the by-products. As St
Thomas Aquinas argued in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics (Book 1, Comment 2):
42
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‘Thus the political community seeks the supreme human good, since it aims at the common
good, which is superior to, and more god-like than, the good of an individual.’
In participating in the greater good of a nation through democratic means, Catholics in
Western democracies ought not react to economic or social change impulsively, as has been
the case in many of the populist movements of the last few years. A more sustainable
approach may be to imagine an imperfect utopia which, however flawed, could still be better
than what one’s country is now. This utopia is not telic but rather an ongoing, collaborative
project in which a nation continuously fashions its own social and political destiny, informed
by its successes and chastened by its failures.46 The imagination of a future for one’s nation
must translate to action and re-creation. Two quotes from Dewey are apt: ‘The self is not
something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action’,47
and: ‘Imagination is the chief instrument of the good’.48 When it comes to the nation state too,
Dewey’s line of thinking is entirely consistent: ‘[I]n actual and concrete organisation and
structure, there is no form of state which can be said to be the best; not at least till history is
ended […] The formation of states must be an experimental process.’49 What breeds
imagination is hope: a hope, pace Rorty, to reduce pain and cruelty for future generations.
Hope can only exist where there is some solidarity between individuals and communities,
where people of different creeds unite to remedy the plights within their own communities. It
would lead to, what has been called, a ‘conservative internationalism’ that was once
championed by Catholics in the early post-war period.50 Policies such as foreign aid,
environmentalism, and pluralism fashioned in a society where its citizenry is striving for the
same goals and hopes of reducing pain and humiliation, would have the potential to become
much easier to address than they would in a society where its citizenry is politically and
culturally divided against itself.
X. Concluding Remarks
Like the labour movements of the 1930s, it is the right time today for Catholics to encourage
fellow citizens to come together and advocate those causes that can benefit their nations.
Catholics around the world in the coming few years will be required to make difficult political
decisions about their countries’ futures and these decisions will be made easier only through a
national pride shared with their fellow compatriots, who, although all living under the ‘same
sky’ do not all have the ‘same horizon’, to paraphrase Konrad Adenauer.51 Each nation has its
own culture and imagination regarding what its future might look like for the next generation
of citizens. A national pride in each country breeds a solidarity for a better society a century
hence, which only then can provide a solid foundation for addressing global issues through
cooperative foreign policy, shared international development goals, and mutually beneficial
relationships.
According to Rorty, this cannot be achieved solely within the ‘Academy’; that is, by
contemplative debate among intellectuals in the universities, but rather must be done through
majoritarian politics and concerted practical action within a pluralistic society, bolstered by
collective efforts (such as labour movements or political programmes advocating systemic
46
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economic reform) with a shared imagination for what their country’s future might look like.52
This project will not reach a point where action is no longer required or the goal is fulfilled,
when Catholics can retreat from engaging in political action but instead, it will be a
continuous collaboration handed down from one generation to another, reshaping itself into
posterity. Yet improvement requires pride in one’s country, having enough invested in it to be
willing to change it for the better. To have a civic system fragmented into competing racial,
religious, sexual, and cultural identities may result in contradictory beliefs and goals that
stymie a nation’s progress. Rather than identity or reactionary politics, Catholics might seek
to promote a kind of solidarity through this national pride, based on hope and shared by
individuals of all backgrounds, who dare to imagine a better future for their nation’s next
generations in which suffering, cruelty, and humiliation are minimised. This ongoing and
creative process might engender a national selfhood with concomitant political and social
programmes. Such collaboration might also result in a lasting solidarity between communities
that, if imagined and strived towards, could possess a genuine possibility of bridging the
increasingly partisan divisions facing liberal democracies today.
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